THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS - A View from Colorado
October 28, 1988
The hiatus after the national convention of 1988 showed an apparent cooling
of conservative ardour for Ronald Reagan's high-tech fantasy popularly known as
Star Wars. Political support for a deployable system seemingly had been crushed
by the overwhelming weight of evidence brought to bear by the nation's physics
community: the university laboratories, the professional societies, and even the
president's own Office of Technology Assessment.
However, few people were foolish enough to believe that conservatives in the
Republican party thought Star Wars was really a bad idea. A more plausible
explanation was that the issue would be a liability to the Republicans in the
elections.
But recent campaign rhetoric has demonstrated that even this perception was illusory or, at best, premature. SDI proponents still seem to be willing, if not eager, to expose this vulnerable but apparently resilient target once again to all the technical, strategic and economic ordnance that the opposition is capable of mustering.
Astonishingly, however, SDI propaganda has not kept up with the times. Its advocates continue to inveigh against old adversaries: alleged Russian violations, offensive deterrence, and the vulnerability of American cities. A dispassionate review of the evidence compiled by the physics laboratories and arms control centers will reveal that these attacks are more suited to inciting hysteria than to informing the public. Consider the merits of these issues in the light of recent history.
Long before Irangate, the Reagan administration demonstrated its contempt for treaties put in place by previous administrations. A favorite tactic is to evade the provisions of a treaty by claiming it has been invalidated by Russian violations. SALT II, for example, negotiated by two previous administrations but never ratified by the U.S. Senate, nonetheless has been respected and reasonably well observed by both sides. During his last term, President Reagan unilaterally chose to repudiate this treaty on the contrived grounds that the Soviets were in serious violation. The charges, only weakly supported by evidence, were exaggerated out of proportion to their military significance in order to delude the public into acceptance of recent American treaty breakouts.
In fact, Soviet compliance with SALT II and other treaties, although by no means exemplary, is about on a par with our own, a fact acknowledged by American experts.
The pervasiveness of misinformation issuing from the Reagan administration on Soviet non-compliance has convinced Americans that we have few useful agreements on arms control, and that the ones we do have are continually violated by the other side. The facts are that we and the Russians have negotiated several longstanding and meaningful treaties. Although each has been productive in some narrow sense, they have not individually or collectively addressed the real issue. Strategic nuclear stockpiles still hover well over the alarming figure of 10,000 on each side.
Mutual deterrence has been the cornerstone of our continued peaceful coexistence with the Soviets since they exploded their first nuclear bomb. It is profoundly valued because it introduces an element of predictability into an otherwise unsettled and potentially dangerous world.
The kernel of deterrence's success lies not so much in the perpetuation of a threat as a greater recognition of our mutual inter-dependence and the need to coexist in order to exist at all. In a moment of lucidity, Caspar Weinberger once conceded to the Aviation and Space Writers Association, "Deterrence through a credible retaliatory capability has worked for nearly 40 years, and there is every reason to believe that this policy will continue to prevent aggression against ourselves and our allies."
The erosion of the politically stabilizing but morally lamentable concept of deterrence by deployment of SDI illuminates another dilemma facing the nation. Implicit in the president's message to "render these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete" was the notion that people would be protected from attack by the impregnable shield afforded by SDI. But tacitly, and with little public notice, this promise has been withdrawn and in its place we have reverted once again to "hard point", i.e., the missile defense of the early 1970s.
Ironically, defending a few missiles (which is marginally possible) makes far
more sense than defending people (which is, according to every rational
analysis, impossible). It makes more sense not only because it may be
technically feasible but because in the big picture it may offer some degree of
stability.
Conservative politicians and pundits continue to hammer away at the theme that,
at present, the U.S. could not stop one incoming enemy missile. On this point
they are correct. If a $200 billion Phase I, or, better yet, if a $1 trillion
full-blown Star Wars were deployed, we could probably shoot down a few dozen
Soviet warheads if the Soviets were so foolish as to launch them. The problem is
that if such an attack were to occur, any strategic defense would be overwhelmed
and our civilization would be obliterated.
We cannot afford to cast aside what little security we still possess to pursue a chimeric dream that promises only the illusion of invulnerability. The possibility of SDI's actually provoking a war is the greater reality. The president of the United States has a sworn obligation to provide for the defense of the nation. He would be well advised to consider the criteria of arms-control adviser Paul H. Nitze: A defense must be cost-effective, able to protect itself and stabilizing in its effects. SDI is none of these.
Howard A. Garcia, Ph.D., is a physicist in Boulder.